It is now beyond doubt that attention to the 'security-development nexus' has become commonplace in national and global policymaking. However, how 'the nexus' is differently imbued with meaning and ultimately employed remains underexplored. In this article, we suggest a possible framework for mapping the multiple understandings that underlie specific articulations of 'the nexus' in order to reveal the ways in which meaning may shift in different (yet seemingly similar) discourses. To this end, we draw upon familiar stories about 'development' and 'security', and we offer a brief reading of ways in which 'the nexus' is articulated in policy texts. Ultimately, this framework may hint at what such articulations may imply for the policy agenda.
Introduction
Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations, 2004: vii) Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. [. . .] DFID, working with poor people and their governments and international partners, can help build a more secure future for us all. (DFID, 2005: 3) A S FORMER UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN boldly states above, 'development and security are inextricably linked'. It is now beyond doubt that attention to the 'security-development nexus' has Special Issue on the Security-Development Nexus Revisited become commonplace in national and global policymaking.
1 The 'securitydevelopment nexus' has also become the focus of key think-tanks, 2 and of figures increasingly prominent in university-based research. 3 In the emerging literature -including the official 'report industry' -there is a seeming consensus that 'security' and 'development' are interconnected, and that their interrelationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-economic landscape. 4 The notion of a 'nexus' seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, an ever-growing amount of economic resources and political will is being poured into the 'security-development nexus' and the attendant revamping of national and multilateral institutions and actions designed to address it. Hence, 'the nexus' matters. Security policies include explicit references to development and poverty reduction in the globalized fight against terrorism (see, for example, European Council, 2003: 2) , while the UN's Millennium Development Goals include direct references to providing peace and security for peoples all over the globe. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (2007: 3) handbook on security system reform and the UK Department for International Development's (2009) white paper Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future provide some of the most recent examples of the assumed interconnections between security and development as a taken-for-granted point of departure.
Yet, what does Kofi Annan 5 mean by claiming that security and development are inextricably linked, that there is a 'security-development nexus', even if its meaning is surely not 'a fixed reality' (see the article by Duffield elsewhere in this issue)? And, importantly, what can/should be done by whom and for whom in the name of such a 'security-development nexus'? Understanding, responding to or enacting a security-development nexus (hereafter, 'the nexus') promises to be a daunting project. One quick foray into current academic debates reveals how notions of both 'security' and 'development' emerge from disparate ontologies, refer to many different empirical realities and processes, and evoke much contestation over meaning. 6 On the one hand, they ('security' and 'development') can be seen as the tools of scholars and policy analysts to describe and analyse macro processes in international affairs and to generate knowledge; on the other, they are used by actors applying these concepts to prescribe processes and determine outcomes. Importantly, as critical scholars have convincingly argued, they can also be seen as discursive constructions that produce the reality they seem to reflect, and thus serve certain purposes and interests. Surely, the power of definition over 'development' and 'security' also implies power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses (see Chandler, 2007) .
Indeed, beyond a recognition of the meshing of processes and domains commonly understood as 'security' and 'development', consensus around what is meant by 'the nexus' rapidly comes tumbling down. These domains remain frustratingly separated in the institutional bodies and organizational structures designed to 'provide' development and 'ensure' security, as well as in the enactment of security and development in particular and localized sites (see articles by Jensen and Orjuela elsewhere in this issue; Öjendal & Lilja, 2009) . Such disconnection renders the calls for concerted attention to 'the nexus' all the more resounding and compelling. Yet, the political purchase the naming of this 'nexus' occasions warns us to be cautious in our embrace of 'the nexus' as a policy premise or even goal (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2007a,b) .
In the realm of policy, the echoes of the harmonious plea for attention to 'the nexus' resonate confusion, lack of conceptual clarity and ideological divisions, at best, and rhetorical facades, interest politics and shallow political correctness, at worst (see Chandler, 2008) . Academic discourses have not -in spite of the high stakes -adequately addressed this 'nexus'. 7 Rather, the relation between development and security has been described as one marked by distance and 'antipathy' (Shaw, Maclean & Black, 2006) , where the two fields have been seen to be mutually 'antagonistic' (Uvin, 2008) . Indeed, Duffield's (2001) statement that, as an intellectual project, the 'security-development' terrain is comparatively novel remains salient. 8 Hence, whereas 'consensus' (or even the semblance of clarity and attendant claims to knowledge of the a priori ontology of these 'essentially contested terms' [Gallie, 1956] ) should not be expected or even desired in intellectual debates, it remains nonetheless underexplored how 'the nexus' is differently experienced, imbued with meaning and ultimately employed. We therefore echo Chandler's (2007: 368) concern that 7 There is of course an impressive and diverse literature within several disciplines on these underlying issues. See, for instance, Chandler (2008); Duffield (2007b) ; Security Dialogue (2008); Hardt & Negri (2000) ; Hettne (1995); Inayatullah & Blaney (2004) . However, here we are zeroing in on the increasing and explicit usage of 'the nexus'. 8 Recently, 'the nexus' has been more frequently and deeply addressed in terms of terrorism and counterinsurgency; see Third World Quarterly (2009).
rather than clarity, the security-development nexus sets up a framework where any external regulatory or interventionist initiative can be talked up by the proposing government or institution as being of vital importance.
Our unease deepens as we note a widespread discourse emerging as though there were broad agreement on both the content of these concepts and the consequences of creating policy that reflects a (certain) understanding of 'the nexus'. And, as always, national/global policy proceeds as though we collectively understood the context and consequences of the workings of a 'security-development nexus', or, alternatively, as though 'it' (as a desirable policy goal) were a recognizable and simple thing to achieve. Here we find a dual dilemma that provides the impetus for this article: first, there is a curious absence of attempts to probe evocations of 'the nexus' in order to discern the possible meanings attributed to it; second, the familiar uneasy relationship between intellectual inquiry and policy formulation becomes particularly fraught in such evocations.
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The aim of this introductory article is nonetheless quite limited: We suggest a critical (fledgling) framework for mapping multiple understandings that arguably underlie specific articulations of 'the nexus'. To this end, we draw upon familiar accounts of different understandings of 'development' and 'security', which derive both from the policy world and from the realm of academic debate, as well as their inevitable interminglings. Ultimately, this guide may hint at what such articulations may imply for the policy agenda.
The article proceeds as follows: First, we briefly discuss our methodology and our understanding of a 'nexus'. Then, in a subsequent section, we retell a brief collection of stories about development and one about security, following these with a discussion of 'the nexus' (or 'nexuses', as it turns out) that emerges through our accounts. The concluding section returns to reflect upon the elusive but paramount importance of how 'the nexus' is understood. Instead of explicitly focusing on particular empirical contexts or policy perspectives in this introductory article, we also draw upon the subsequent articles in this issue to flesh out our inchoate mapping.
A Note on Methodology: Narratives and Map-Making
Any account of the vast fields that encompass considerations and practices of 'development' and 'security' will undoubtedly be partial. The politics of inclusion/exclusion and framing involved in delimiting or mapping any field, for instance, are well debated (see, for example, Salter, 2007) . Following the move in critical scholarship that makes explicit how authoritative 9 The International Peace Academy's programme on the 'Security-Development Nexus' illustrates the difficulty of combining an explicit and careful analysis of the ways these concepts/practices are imbued with meaning with the demands for recommendations that the urgent need for policy transformation and even intervention oblige (International Peace Academy, 2004: 1, 17; 2006: 2) .
knowledge is constructed and meaning is imposed through credible, comprehensible narratives, we refer to our brief accounts of 'development' and 'security' as narratives (see Butler, 2004: 4-5; Zalewski, 2006) . The stories we relay, however, are not whimsical tales, but instead rely on familiar accounts of those concepts/practices -for example, ones that are retold in various forms in basic (Western 'academic') textbooks on 'development theory' or 'security studies'. These overarching narratives are made up of subplots (e.g. the dominant realist story about state security and the counter-story about 'human security') that include a whole array of elements. They 'answer', for instance, what 'it' ('security' or 'development') is about; who 'it' concerns; what 'its' referents are; who acts; what 'its' prescription for action is; and 'its' desired end result. In our account, we rejig the familiar overarching narratives about development and security in order to clearly show the similarities of their substories and thus lay the groundwork for mapping different accounts of the 'nexus'. We do so through identifying and briefly introducing the following six storylines (or approaches): (1) development/security as modern (teleological) narrative; (2) broadening, deepening and humanizing development/security; (3) development/security as impasse/impossible; (4) post-development/ security; (5) development/security as a technique of governmentality; and (6) development/security as globalized. We do not, however, trace the ways in which each of these approaches has grappled historically with related 'security/development' issues (such as the connections between poverty and conflict or peace and prosperity (see the article by Hettne elsewhere in this issue).
Our six accounts of development/security might at times seem to belong to different orders, logics or grammars, often blending description, prescription, strategy and critique. However, read together, these accounts (although surely dog-eared and limited) may offer a useful guideline for better discerning how and when shifts in meaning occur in different (yet seemingly similar) discourses about 'the nexus'. We therefore then mesh these parallel development/security narratives together into six (less familiar, but nonetheless recognizable) accounts of 'the nexus' -for example, 'security-development as modern (teleological) narrative'. Making explicit what reading our parallel accounts may imply for filling 'the nexus' with meaning points to the multitude of meanings possible in the many different ways in which 'the nexus' is used (and critiqued). This elaboration, we believe, places in sharp contradistinction the (sometimes) facile evocation of 'the nexus' in ever-widening policy circles.
Importantly, it becomes overly clear -though not empirically proven -that our map must contain many more than these six accounts of 'the nexus': the seemingly incompatible stories of various ontologically and epistemologically different accounts of development/security in this 'nexus' are ridiculously plentiful, even infinite. In inviting the reader to probe the myriad meanings of 'the nexus' already discursively available, we fundamentally challenge the seeming consensus view of the nexus as imminent promise: something given, clear and shared.
The 'Security-Development Nexus':
What Is a Nexus Anyway?
The complexity of 'the nexus' and the ways in which it is represented and produced through both development and security discourses enjoy long histories. Historically, as both Duffield and Hettne convincingly argue elsewhere in this issue, the interminglings of strategies of security and development have been commonplace in policy debates and implementation (see also Buur, Jensen & Stepputat, 2007; Uvin, 2008) . Indeed, attention to 'security' was a pinnacle of much 'development' strategy during the colonial era; similarly, the Marshall Plan offers an example of 'development' concerns as central to Western security policies. However, contrary to the contemporary scene, none of this was carried out in the name of a nexus, that is, an explicit articulation of the connections between the two.
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Contemporary experiences of (in)security and (under)development, however, spill over the well-worn frameworks for their understanding. Relatedly, current security-development problems thwart the policies created for their redress through such frameworks. The changing notions of 'the nexus' as political concept/practice and lived experience are further explored in the articles in this special issue. Björn Hettne's (2010) tracing of the macro-history of the evolution of the security-development dynamic in the European scene, for instance, helps us to see how the entrenched 'grids of intelligibility' (Dillon, 2004) for understanding security-development have evolved. The remaining articles offer detailed accounts of how contemporary articulations of 'the nexus' play out in the politics of aid, the control and outlawing of migration, and the shift in focus to the security of people living within states (Duffield, 2010) ; the policies and practices in the war on gangs in a South African township (Jensen, 2010) ; and the local, both contradictory and mutually reinforcing, experiences of people in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Orjuela, 2010) .
To be clear, in this article (and this special issue as a whole) we do not argue for filling the idea of a nexus with a particular content or form that shall accurately describe reality or prescribe desirable futures. Instead, we see 'the nexus' as representing a many-stranded point of suture. Hence, a nexus can be understood as a network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects; alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relations.
Stories About Development

Development as Modern (Teleological) Narrative
As a deeply historical concept, 'development' has been understood as a process of biological evolution, signifying the ultimate fulfilling of the process of becoming what one is 'supposed to be ' (Nisbet, 1980) . As it were, 'development' became a key strategy for state-building in the post-colonial societies in which there was an urgent need for both economic growth and political consolidation (Simon, 1999) . Unfettered belief in modernization through 'development' as a quick route away from prevailing 'underdevelopment' followed suit (Rostow, 1962; de Janvry & Kanbur, 2006) . The state was the sovereign key actor and 'guarantor' for development (measured in economic terms). Importantly, through 'development' so understood, nation-states were to be invented, established, secured and evolved along a linear trajectory of 'progress', following the path forged by Europe. The political and economic elites were the necessary drivers of this process, and 'trickle-down' was the hope for the rest. Accordingly, development was not only driven by the state, but also served to constitute the state. However, the post-colonial world in the 1960/70s did not realize this modernist dream; instead, social and political problems proliferated, unavoidably calling into question the teleology of 'development'.
Broadening, Deepening and Humanizing Development
(At least) two distinctly different counter-narratives came to challenge the mainstream story, serving to broaden, deepen and humanize development: First, it was countered by a Marxist/structuralist fundamental critique, focusing on international power structures in combination with the prevailing capitalist mode of production. This critique was theoretically explained through 'world system theory' (Wallerstein, 1974) , and more concretely through 'dependencia' (Prebisch, 1950; Frank, 1969) . These schools forcefully emphasized the structurally exploitative nature of the capitalist world system and its negative impact on Third World development. On account of these factors, it was argued, there was a necessity for poor Third World countries to 'delink' and develop through self-sufficiency. Hence, the story of (mainstream) development was reversed, yet still teleological, state-centric and elite-driven. Second, at the other end of the spectrum, we saw a 'participatory revolution' that emphasized the significance of 'reconnecting' to the true 'subjects' of development, namely, the poor, the local, the grass roots and the voiceless. To 'put the last first' (Chambers, 1983) , 'small is beautiful', 'appropriate technology' (Schumacher, 1973) and (later) 'empowerment' (Friedman, 1992) became common calls. These alternative development approaches looked both 'inwards' and 'backwards' for (true) development. The shift in focus from state-centric development to 'human' development is perhaps the most profound and durable impact that can be traced to these critiques of the dominant development narrative (Pietersee, 2000) .
Development as Impasse
The dented credibility of the mainstream story of development and its neoliberal decade of the 1980s, including the infamous structural adjustment programmes, did anything but rescue mainstream 'development'. Consequently, it was profoundly questioned, from another angle, by critics arguing the 'impasse' of development theory/practice (Booth, 1985; see also Schurman, 1993) . According to this storyline, (mainstream and alternative) development had been tried and did not work; furthermore, 'it' was ineffective and possibly harmful. The supposedly desired state of development did not appear desirable. This idea of 'impasse' was triply fed by the actual failure of 'development' to alleviate poverty in the Third World; the broad postcolonial critique of development as an instrument of colonial power and the portrayal of the 'Third World' as homogenous; and, finally, by the obvious overbelief in the state as the agent and referent in the development process, in the wake of emerging globalization (Schuurman, 1993 (Schuurman, , 2000 .
Post-Development
The critique of the grand idea of 'development' was further deepened in the postmodernism/post-colonialism pulse. 'Development' (as process or thing) had no inherent substance and/or, as discursive practice, it was imperialistic and reproduced colonial attitudes and power relations. Focus was placed on what was done in the name of development, not on what form of development was desirable. A school of 'post-development' emerged (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema, 1997; Esteva, 1992) , claiming that the idea of 'development' de facto made substantial, from-within progress impossible, disempowered people, and disrupted existing local power structures, thus creating instability and conflict. Accordingly, 'development' was counterproductive (as in the above account), ethically corrupt, and served to uphold differences and hierarchies. 'Development' was seen as the reason for, and guardian of, inequalities between people and societies, not the solution to them.
Development as Technique of Governmentality
In reaction (in part) to the recent shift in development policy away from a traditional neoliberal trend and towards a call for stronger institutions and more responsible regulation (Craig & Porter, 2006 ; see also Bello, 2005; Hettne, 2010; World Bank, 1997) , as well as the focus on bolstering 'failed/ fragile' states (OECD, 2007) in the wake of the global 'War on Terror', critics of the politics of aid and development called attention to how 'development' has become a technique of governmentality, 11 of disciplinary and biopolitical control (Sylvester, 2006) . In Duffield's (2010) words, understanding development and underdevelopment biopolitically means understanding them 'in terms of how life is to be supported and maintained, and how people are expected to live, rather than according to economic and state-based models'. Read this way, practices of development, ostensibly designed to 'uplift' first states, and later societies and peoples, are techniques of government (broadly understood) that separate lives worth living from those that are expendable, dangerous, or insufficient and unacceptable because of their incompleteness (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat, 2007; Dillon, 2008: 310) . This approach asks questions about the ways in which human lives are regulated (by whom and for what purposes), and the violence and marginalization that such regulation entails.
Globalized Development
Globalization has challenged the 'traditional' idea of development, both in terms of 'global governance' narratives and those more critical narratives that embrace a just and environmentally sustainable global domain as the desirable goal of development. The global (good) governance discourse holds that (neoliberal) globalization works through processes such as trade, migration, aid flows and foreign direct investments, but, importantly, fails because of feeble attempts at regulating these on a global scale (see Risse-Kappen, 1995) . For many, 'global development' is understood as a process that undermines the authority of the state, along with its capacity to govern and to 'uplift' lives in any particular territory. Hence, as (the idea of) 'global governance' gains momentum, global 'regimes' (human rights, sustainable development, etc.) are vigorously pursued, and issues previously thought of as geographically appearing (only) in the developing world are seen as global (hence common) concerns (Hettne, 2010) . 'Development', according to a slightly different line of critique, fuels (environmentally unsustainable) change, mobility and the restructuring of (g)local power structures, thus exacerbating the vulnerabilities (such as poverty and gender-based violence) of those most at risk, triggering conflicts and even imminent planetary environmental catastrophe (Cerny, 1999; Anderson, 1999; Junne & Verkoren, 2004) .
Stories About Security
Security as Modern (Teleological) Narrative
Global politics (and the field of international relations that studies it) is predominantly about (state) security -its procurement, its maintenance, its promise. Or so we are led to believe. In the grammar of modern politics, the state is understood as 'the foundation of freedom, democracy and the good society' (Neocleous, 2008: 4) . The dominant and oft-told story of the state, the international system of states and survival is a story about emergence: becoming (secure) and fulfilling the promise of achieved security (Dillon, 2008; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) . It can therefore be seen as a modern -even teleological -narrative of progress: insecurity (in the past) necessitates the promise of security (now) and the ultimate achievement of security and all that security implies (in the future). In short, in modern political imagination, 'security' has traditionally revolved around the principle of modern state sovereignty. If the state is not 'secure', then political order unravels and ultimately citizens, and all other possible 'referents of security', are imperilled. Ensuring state survival -traditionally through military means -trumps any other aspect of politics, either nationally or in the international state system. Although security is always ultimately deferred, and new threats inevitably arise, security is represented as an immanent promise (Dillon, 1996) . 12 (Inevitable) danger and threat require the continual enactment of security measures 13 that will (ultimately) end insecurity and enable the 'good society' to flourish and develop.
Although it has weathered much critique and undergone numerous revisions (e.g. the addition to this story of other means for achieving [state] securitythat is, economic power, diplomacy, etc.), the basic logic of this story still dominates the agenda in the worlds of security policy and academia. 'Security' remains a necessary and fundamentally 'good' thing, and it shall be maximized (Bigo, 2001) , even as it is parsed into different sectors (e.g. the economic sector, the environmental sector; see Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) .
Broadening, Deepening and Humanizing Security
The meaning of security has nonetheless been fiercely contested, both within policy circles and within academia. Much of the contention has been about deepening or widening security beyond the state to include different threats and referent 'objects'.
14 This move has coincided with an increasingly accepted truism in both policy and academic circles that the nation-state system lacks the tools with which to contend with today's threats -which include terrorist networks, gender-based violence, violent 'ethnic' discrimination, global pandemics and climate change. The multiplicity of security providers and the increasing privatization and commodification of 'security' services dislocate 'security' as a (national) public good further from the modern sovereign state (Zedner, 2009) .
Perhaps most significant has been the shift in focus from state security to 'human security', viewed as a sorely needed venue for highlighting the particular vulnerabilities of peoples who suffer violence from representatives of the state, as well as other forms of violence and injustices. Although also the subject of much debate and critique for being alternately too wide, too narrow, empty, etc., human security offers its advocates a language for addressing different experiences of (in)security. 15 Feminist analysis of security as deeply gendered runs as a strand throughout all of these moves to deepen, widen and humanize security, raising vital questions of voice, identity, power and location. 16 
Security as Impossible
In concert with the appeal to look elsewhere for the sources of, experiences of and solutions to insecurity for referents other than (or in addition to) the state, a line of critique emerged that explicitly focused on how security measures employed by the state (but also by groups of people and individuals) often create ripples of violence and fear and produce more insecurity -both for those whom security measures aim to protect and for others. 17 Variations of this critique coincide in the argument that security measures designed to secure states, humans and/or societies instead (or also) cause harm to people, cultures and the natural environment. Furthermore, security measures increase fear and a sense of impending danger: the prescribed order, stability or 'fortress' is inherently precarious and in need of reinforcing (Campbell, 1998; Dillon, 1996) .
Post-Security
Moreover, queries into the practice of security as dangerous and productive of relations of violence and fear resonated with another avenue of critique, 14 See, for example, Brundtland (1989) here summarized as post-security. In line with the 'discursive turn' in social science more generally, scholars criticized the notion of security as a thing, condition or state of being that could be attained. 'Securitization' and calls for 'desecurization' are the most familiar and well-accepted reconceptualizations of security as discursive practice (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998; Waever, 1995) . Additionally, critical scholars argued that security, as master narrative, substantiates the political body in the name of which it is ostensibly operating, be that 'the state', 'the culture' or 'women'. In so doing, 'security' produces the very subject it purports to secure (Campbell, 1998; Dillon, 1996; Stern, 2005) . The political power of security as imagined above derives from the (im)possibility (Pin-Fat, 2000) of its promise, along with the attendant perpetual production of danger and fear.
Security as Technique of Governmentality
In response to the violence and control that accompany 'security' and securing, so blatant, for example, in the recent 'War on Terror', critics have addressed security as a technique of governing danger and contingency. Security, in these readings, is seen as a technique of sovereign power that produces certain sorts of subjects and involves oppression, regulation, violence, control, policing and surveillance of life itself (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat, 2007; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Duffield, 2010; Huysmans, 2006) . Accordingly, securing practices serve as counterinsurgency tactics against challenges to the accepted neoliberal order (Duffield, 2007b (Duffield, , 2010 Jensen, 2010) . Such avenues of thought, for instance, place familiar ways of framing the tradeoffs between liberty and security under critical scrutiny, arguing that they are written out of a shared underlying -violent -grammar (Dillon & Reid, 2009; Huysmans, 2004; Jabri, 2007; Walker, 2006) . The idiom of risk avoidance (through insurances) commodifies the contingency that living necessarily entails and serves as a technological device to 'secure' (certain) forms of life and render others not worthy of insuring (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero & van Munster, 2008; Duffield, 2010; Security Dialogue, 2008) .
Globalized Security
The increasing appeal of human security in global policy discourse coincided with a widely adopted move to speak of the globe (or the international community) as the appropriate realm through which to guarantee (global) security and human rights. Security is thus globalized. This move reflects the growing ontology of globalization as a way of making sense -and ultimately waylaying -global dangers attendant on the modern human condition, through, among other vectors, the notion of risk management (Beck, 2006) . Global environmental sustainability, including the mitigation of the causes and effects of global warming and natural disasters, has become perhaps the most pressing globalized security concern. Furthermore, human security as global offers a platform from which an idea of a transnational humanitarian responsibility for human welfare could be translated into policy such as the 'right to protection' (Glasius & Kaldor, 2006; ICISS, 2001 ).
Mapping 'the Nexus' Taking seriously the above stories allows us to critically reassess the oftimplied pretence of consensus around 'the nexus' as a move that (intentionally or unintentionally) glosses over differences and obfuscates the complexity, the politics and the ethical implications of the practices enabled through the naming of 'the nexus'.
In the next few paragraphs, we will mesh our 'parallel' stories, creating some common narratives with surely overlapping tangents. Other narratives (such as the combination of 'security as modern (teleological) narrative' with 'broadening, deepening and humanizing development') that criss-cross seemingly incompatible accounts of security/development will be left unexplored, but will be alluded to in our cursory reading of the opening citations in the next section. Our intention here is to make some sense in the cosmology of possible and de facto usages, and to help us see the very many ways in which security-development is imbued with meaning (and therefore, again, to suggest that we need to be cautious in swallowing facile references to 'the nexus' without proper rumination).
The Security-Development Nexus as Modern (Teleological) Narrative
As we saw above, (traditional) 'security' and 'development' have been imbued with meaning through linear modernist discourses that reflect European experience and resonate with colonial logics (see Hettne's article elsewhere in this issue). Security and development are spatially located in a particular bounded geographical space -usually the state, but also increasingly the region (e.g. the European Union) -and temporally located through a particular historical trajectory in relation to other geographical spaces (Bhabha, 2004; Hutchings, 2008; Jabri, 2007; Walker, 2006) . Read through this common story, the promise of security depends upon a successful (and sure-footed) march towards progress and modernity and the forms of modern life that inhere in this trajectory, and vice versa (see Duffield's discussion elsewhere in this issue). When spatially located within the same place (state), 'the nexus' emerges as the juncture through which the conditions of and for security mutually reinforce those for development and progress: internal confluence.
Here, for instance, economic growth, democratization and social welfare (conditions of development) require a state to have considerable domestic control, a strong defence and high levels of political legitimacy (conditions of security), and again the reverse logic holds. 'The nexus' so understood creates ideally a double-bind where security and development mutually reinforce each other. However, in contexts where neither security nor development (understood according to the storyline above) is attainable, the mutuality crumbles. In most of the 'developing world', these preconditions have not been met, rendering 'the nexus' dysfunctional. Most of the policy community nevertheless maintains this variation of 'the nexus' as recipe for the mutual achievement of security and development as a primary policy goal (see OECD, 2008) .
'The nexus' also refers to a relation of implication across borders -or, in other words, a link from there to here, then to now. In this sense, 'the nexus' bridges the spatial and temporal (e.g. developing countries as 'lagging behind' those more 'developed') divergence that is implied when the (in)security and continued development of one state (e.g. the USA) is implicated in the security and -much 'failed' -development of another (e.g. the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Emphasis is placed on the bridge occurring between (our future) security (as paramount and located in one place -the North) and development (over/down/back there/then). However, both of these -'the nexus' as internal confluence and 'the nexus' as spatio-temporal bridge -are compatible.
Security-Development Nexus: Deepened, Broadened, Humanized
In contrast, we can identify the 'counterpoint' or 'alternative' to these dominant stories. Such alternative narratives ostensibly provide an escape route from the prevailing (and predetermined) notions of 'what and how one is supposed to become' secure, developed. Read this way, 'the nexus' reflects a conjoining of challenging views of what the foundation for good, safe and just society might be. This nexus might rely upon a more cyclical temporality, as it gazes backwards in time in order to find the genuine, the good and the (truly) desirable state of living, of security and safety achieved -for humans, women, cultures or the natural environment. Or it may involve another form of forward trajectory than that embarked upon in (neo)liberal securitydevelopment -for example, one that attends to the localized experiences (fears, desires, needs, etc.) of vulnerable peoples.
18 This reconceived 'security-development' (be it human or environmentally sustainable) challenges, indeed negates, the mainstream idea of determinism in what it is one is sup-posed to be(come). In this logic, 'the nexus' can perhaps be best illustrated as the merging of human development and human security -as intricate and complex ambitions in idealist and normative combinations.
Security-Development Nexus as Impasse/Impossible
In contradistinction to the above conceptualization of security-development as accurate reflection of a desired reality, one can see critics both of development as 'impasse' and of security as 'impossible' as coinciding in their belief that these concepts/practices are both mutually constitutive and misconceived, and increasingly so (see articles by Duffield and Jensen in this issue for different variations of such critique.) For a plethora of reasons within each of these fields, (real?) development and security remain perpetually out of reach. Efforts at achieving development breed underdevelopment, more poverty, disenfranchisement. Security carries with it insecurity, violence and threat in, for instance, the theatre of 'new wars' (Kaldor, 2007a) . The ways in which they merge (such as in the ways in which development breeds poverty and dependence and therewith increasing ripples of violence) as they are currently pursued in (global) policy are at best meaningless and futile for the real betterment of peoples' lives and safety; at worst they create the security-development problem they are expected to solve, in direct contrast to the 'recipe' proposed in the above story of 'the nexus' as modern (teleological) narrative. According to the 'impasse/impossible' account, as currently articulated and implemented, 'the nexus' is empty, impossible, harmful; the policies enacted in its name achieve little, if anything, desirable, but instead cause harm and occasion the wasting of time and money.
Post-Security-Development
This account is similar to the above, but places more emphasis on the 'nexus' as linked discursive practices that produce certain realities and are thus the tools of power. The enactment of these practices often fulfils those interests that are implicated in their motivating rationale. They are mutually constitutive and are written out of a similar (if not the same) modern neoliberal (post-colonial) logic in which sovereignty (of the individual and of the state) privileges certain subjectivities (see articles by Duffield and Jensen in this issue). Practices and discourses of security-development so understood reproduce spatiotemporally defined relations of inequality, injustice, harmful mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, violence, insecurity and danger. According to this account, security and development are both (im)possible and inherently oxymoronic in themselves, as well as in combination (i.e. in 'the nexus'). They become self-perpetuating and impossible promises, as well as vectors for those with vested interests to protect. This is scary and intimidating for the rest of us. Hence this nexus should be refused, critiqued and avoided (see, for example, Neocleous, 2008) .
Security-Development as Technique of Governmentality
Security and development are seen as mutually reinforcing idioms and techniques of biopower through which subjectivity, imagination and ultimately life are governed. Biopolitics is necessarily about the governing and regulation of (the development of) life, through, for instance, interrelated efforts aimed at 'improving' life, the management of contingency and the exclusion of 'the dangerous' (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat, 2007: 15; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266) . According to this line of critique, 'the nexus' emerges as the site in which counterinsurgency (understood broadly) plays out (Duffield, 2007a,b; Jensen, 2010) . Hence, a biopolitical reading of 'the nexus' might enquire into, for instance, the politics of aid, humanitarian assistance and the 'good governance' agenda, as well as the localized and globalized technologies and practices that enact the global 'War on Terror'. Such readings make visible and trace the ways in which techniques of 'security/development' counter the insurgency against sovereign biopower -through controlling, disciplining, 'uplifting' and regulating the 'dangerous', the unruly, the subalterns and the voiceless (see articles by Duffield and Jensen in this issue) . Understood this way, the discursive use and concrete enactment of 'the nexus' (through both technologies and policies) seemingly evacuate the political question of the ethics of 'governing the other', and life itself, and technologize (or in other words, depoliticize) the (bio)politics of security-development.
Globalized Security-Development
This 'nexus' is written out of a logic similar to that of 'security-development: deepened, broadened, humanized and cyclical', yet one that also is embedded in an ontology of globalization; one that no longer relies on 'methodological territorialization' (see Hettne's article elsewhere in this issue; Scholte, 2005: 27) . In short, the pervasive modern representation of the world as being made up of distinct social, political, cultural spaces bounded by territory has had to fundamentally change to better reflect the empirical reality of a globalized world in which such distinctions blur. 'Globalization' therefore demands the rephrasing of perennial questions about the organization and experience of political, cultural, social and individual life, as well as the structures and institutions designed to govern society and interact with the natural world. Uncertainty and contingency, along with subjectivity, belonging, accountability and responsibility, are globalized. Understood through this prism, 'the nexus' acts as a vector for representing (and addressing holistically) the interrelated and mutually constitutive human global survival issues, such as global climate change, global food security, natural disasters, global energy and water crisis, and gender-based violence, as well as threats and risks associated with violent conflict and acts of terrorism. As such, it is the ultimate arena.
Ridiculous and Representative? Stories Aplenty
Parsing 'development' and 'security' into the (separate) substories told as precursors to the above six security-development stories invites the drawing of a ridiculous anti-figure designed to represent and allude to the multitude of possible narratives about nexuses (see Figure 1 ). As noted above, we have briefly fleshed out only six accounts -the six (horizontal ones) that possibly 'make sense' from an ontological/epistemological point of view -of the myriad possible stories about the 'nexus' represented in this anti-figure. However, the policy world, like all other fields of knowledge, does not adhere to ontological or epistemological consistency; policy documents are peppered with seemingly incompatible stories (these are illustrated aplenty through the diagonal lines drawn above). Many even seem to make good policy sense.
In the following paragraphs, we briefly return to the citations that opened this article in order to exemplify how the map in Figure 1 (with its supply of readily available narratives about 'the nexus') could be employed in an attempt to trace how security and development, and 'the nexus' between them, shift and slide in meaning even in these short citations -as well as in our critical reading of them. We are aware that the 'boxes' used to connote the distinct approaches indubitably leak and change form; other 'boxes', neither inscribed nor imagined here, surely inform the articulation and practice of 'the nexus' in disparate contexts. We nonetheless use these 'boxes' as tools of analysis. We address A Secure World (United Nations, 2004) more fully and then touch on the statements by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as a point of contrast.
Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations, 2004: vii) This citation states clearly that development and security are linked. Implied here is that security and development are known and knowable processes, conditions or states of being that intersect. What is implied by 'security' and 'development', although not explicit, takes shape through the ways in which they are evoked in the text. References to 'a more secure world' draw upon the framing of 'globalized security-development', which arguably lends legitimacy and urgency to the call for 'giving the poor countries a real chance to develop'(understood through the modern teleological narrative?) as the only viable way out of the implied 'insecure' world in which we now live.
The scary image is cultivated in the sentence that begins 'Extreme poverty . . .', which arguably draws upon the 'broadening, deepening and humanizing' discourse in its depiction of human insecurities and symptoms of arrested human development or underdevelopment. The sentence then shifts to the 'modern teleological narrative' as source for presenting the scenario of 'other threats' (terrorism?), civil conflicts, and the violence and destruction they wreak. Importantly, drawing upon the story of 'the nexus' as told through 'postsecurity-development' allows us to discern how the ghosts of a colonial past must be exorcized from the promise of a more secure world for the latter to be credible. Furthermore, such a lens reveals how the depiction of a 'fertile breeding ground for threats' evokes the image of the political body/society as infested wound, which must be cured of its 'germs' for it to be secure.
'Security as technique of governmentality' helps us see how efforts to reduce poverty and mitigate disease, as well as the very identification of poverty and disease as a breeding ground for threat, control the population implied in the text and discern the life that is possible and desirable in this potential breeding ground (Elbe, 2008) . Such efforts ensure that these threats do not spread to healthier (less fertile) grounds in distant and safer places, such as the 'rich' countries alluded to in the next sentence.
The text continues by suggesting that 'even people in rich countries will be more secure' if these unhealthy breeding grounds are cured. Here, development as written through the 'modern teleological narrative' is again evoked, as it is clear that the relevant political-economic unit is the state and that certain 'countries' are richer and further along the path to wealth, prosperity, stability and security than those poorer countries in the developing world. The solution to underdevelopment-insecurity lies in development assistance. If the rich governments help the poor countries along this path (through defeating poverty and disease), the text promises us, then even people in these rich countries will be more secure.
Whispers of warning derived from the 'security-development as impasse/ impossible' narrative resound from this claim and invite us to wonder how further development assistance will help eradicate poverty and the threats it supposedly breeds. Furthermore, the fear that human development (imbued with meaning through the 'broadening, deepening and humanizing' discourse) is being subsumed, even thwarted, through its securitization (identified as such through a 'post-security-development' reading) also urges us (as critics) to question how the alleviation of poverty and disease there has become a counterinsurgency strategy here. Reading through, 'security as technique of governmentality' suggests that framing the alleviation of poverty and disease there as a threat to security here (spatio-temporal bridge in 'modern teleological narrative') enables us to employ techniques to control and discipline all of us both here and there (Bigo, 2001) . We now draw attention also to the citation from the DFID document, because few documents are as explicit as this on the one-to-one connection between (in)security and development:
Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. . . . DFID, working with poor people and their governments and international partners, can help build a more secure future for us all. (DFID, 2005: 3) A slightly different constellation of meanings of 'the nexus' emerges than in the previous quotation. The fabulous first sentence, 'war kills development as well as people', first gains meaning through the evocation of the 'modern teleological narrative', where development as known process can be 'killed' or arrested. It then swiftly moves on to draw upon the 'broadening, deepening and humanizing' discourse in references to the poor, before shifting back to the 'modern teleological narrative' when separating security from, for instance, clean water. It then returns to the 'modern teleological narrative' in making sense of the agents who will 'build a more secure future' (including DFID), to finally glide into a 'globalized security' story, in its call for a secure future 'for us all'.
Reading critically through the lenses offered by the 'post-security-development' and the 'security-development as technique of governmentality' perspectives tells another story. It allows us to glimpse, for instance, how 'poor people' are being situated and represented in this text. Poor people, the text implies, are dangerous and threaten all of our security. They therefore should be controlled by 'development' and (assumedly) good governance. Hence the quotation's 'globalized development' approach appears as a means to a 'security-development as technique of governmentality' ends, mixing the seeming altruistic common concern of universal poverty alleviation with a narrow imperative to control the 'wretched of the earth'.
Conclusion: The Significance of Identifying 'the Nexus(es)'
The above (critical) cursory reading does not leave us much wiser as to what 'the nexus' is, should be or does. Hopefully -and importantly -however, it may open venues of critique for assessing what is being done in the name of 'the nexus' by exploring how different narratives imbue it with meaning, even in the same policy text. With this in mind, this article has tried to achieve three things: First, it has drawn attention to the claims that there is an empirically real and growing 'nexus', which is reflected in the increased usage of the term 'development-security nexus'. Although timely, we aver that this borders on the banal: 'the nexus', however conceived, reflects a reality that resonates in the experiences and imaginations of many; it is being used to 'describe' a growing realm. Second, and perhaps more intriguingly, the 'content' or form of 'the nexus' is not clear. It is therefore open for all kinds of (illicit) use under the guise of progressive and ethically palatable politics. We believe that we have, in the above, illustrated that different discourses imbue 'the nexus' with different meanings. Third, as 'the nexus' is being and can be used as a 'recognizable' and seemingly comprehensible narrative, vari-ous processes can be pursued in the name of (more or less) in/compatible combinations of security-development, as delineated above. We have only touched upon this last point in this article. The subsequent articles in this thematic issue, however, will show a multitude of ways of how 'security' and 'development' can be understood and combined and ultimately enacted, for purposes of understanding our emerging world or for purposes of shaping it. There should be no doubt, however, that in the foreseeable future how we perceive, pursue and produce 'the nexus' will be crucial in this regard.
